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The Moral Dimension of Qiyun Aesthetics and Some 
Kantian Resonances 
 
Xiaoyan Hu1 
University of Liverpool 
 
ABSTRACT. In this paper, I suggest that the notion of qiyun (spirit 
consonance) in the context of landscape painting involves a moral dimension. 
The Confucian doctrine of sincerity involved in bringing the landscapist’s or 
audience’s mind in accord with the Dao underpins the moral dimension of 
spiritual communion between artist, object, audience and work. By projecting 
Kant’s, and Schiller’s somewhat modified Kantian philosophy of aesthetic 
autonomy and the moral relevance of art into the qiyun-focused context, we 
shall see that reflection on parallels and differences between the two cultural 
traditions helps to better understand the moral dimension of qiyun aesthetics. 
                                                          
1 Email: huxiaoyan2013@gmail.com I wish to thank Prof. Simon Hailwood for his 
feedback on this paper. I appreciate Prof. Joseph Harroff’s comments on my paper ‘Moral 
Enlightenment of Classical Chinese Art’ (an early version of the first part of this paper) 
presented in the American Society of Aesthetics 2018 Eastern Division Meeting in April 
2018 in Philadelphia. He remarks that my qiyun-focused interpretive framework serves ‘to 
unsettle the dualistic assumptions undergirding pervasive ideals of aesthetic autonomy and 
the widely held prejudice that Confucianism (unlike its Daoist and Chan counterparts) as a 
tradition has been largely responsible for introducing so much heavy-handed didacticism 
and oppressive moral symbolism into Chinese arts in service of a repressive Family-State 
apparatus’. The second part of the paper was shortlisted by the European Society for 
Aesthetics for 2019 Essay prize, and presented in the ESA 2019 Annual Conference on 14th 
June 2019 in the University of Warsaw, the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy 
51st Annual Conference on 21st June 2019 in Bath Spa University, and the 21st International 
Congress of Aesthetics on 25th July 2019 in the University of Belgrade. I also thank Dr. 
Roger Clarke for inviting me to give a talk on this topic in Comparative Philosophy 
Workshop in Queen’s University Belfast on 27th June 2019. Many thanks for audiences 
listening to my presentations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One may insist that the notion of qiyun (spirit consonance) in Chinese 
painting is merely an aesthetic criterion, not for moral enlightenment, and 
aesthetic autonomy and moral cultivation are two disparate categories.2 In 
this paper, I will argue that this is a mistake. I attempt to show why qiyun in 
the context of landscape painting should not be regarded merely as an 
aesthetic criterion, and how it embodies the dimension of moral cultivation 
through spiritual communion between artist and object, audience and work.  
In the first section, I will firstly show that the notion of qiyun applied 
by the 10th century landscapist and theorist Jing Hao in landscape painting, 
and further developed by the 11th century art historian Guo Ruoxu (ca. 
1080) and the early Yuan connoisseur Tang Hou (active in the late 13th 
century and the early 14th century) involves a moral dimension. Then, we 
will see that the moral relevance of qiyun-focused landscape painting is 
reflected in these two aspects: (i) the way landscapists and audiences have 
                                                          
2 The notion of qiyun is initially proposed by Xie He (active 500–ca. 535) in his six 
laws of Chinese painting. I have suggested that the notion of qiyun includes four 
dimensions: where the process of creation by painters is concerned, qiyun refers to the 
essential quality of the object depicted; once the painter releases the brush to complete a 
work, qiyun becomes the expressive quality or content of the work; the ability to create a 
painting replete with qiyun is in relation to the artist’s qiyun; qiyun implies the spiritual 
communion and sympathetic resonance between artist and object (Hu, 2016: 247–268).   
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of contemplating the world and seeking spiritual communion with it, and (ii) 
the experience of (Confucian) sincerity (cheng) which leads the kindred 
minds to achieve spiritual communion and resonance during artistic practice 
or appreciation. In the second section, I examine the efficacy of projecting 
Kant’s and Schiller’s philosophy of aesthetic autonomy and the moral 
relevance of art into a qiyun-focused landscape painting context, and show 
that the differences and parallels between the two cultural traditions help us 
better understand the moral dimension of qiyun aesthetics, increase 
appreciation of problems with earlier Chinese scholars’ adoption of Kantian 
ideas in their writings on the Chinese aesthetic tradition, and illuminate 
some limitations in Kantian aesthetics. 
 
2. Qiyun, Spiritual Kinship and Sincere Will 
 
Xie He initially proposes the notion of qiyun in his six laws of painting in 
the context of figure painting as dominant genre, while his text does not give 
qiyun a moral dimension. However, the moral dimension of qiyun is shared 
in the texts written by Jing Hao, Guo Ruoxu, and Tang Hou. In Notes on the 
Art of Brush (Bifa Ji), Jing Hao’s application of qiyun in landscape painting, 
involves a moral dimension to the qiyun of depicted natural objects (see 
Munakata, 1974: 13–14). His view that natural objects such as the pine tree 
share congenial attributes with the virtuous originates in the Analects, where 
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Confucius says that ‘The Virtue of a gentleman is like the wind, and the 
Virtue of a petty person is like the grass— when the wind moves over the 
grass, the grass is sure to bend’ (Slingerland, 2006: 36; Analects, 12.19). 
Jing Hao also suggests that capturing the object’s zhen (internal reality) 
which is embodied through qi and yun requires and accompanies the moral 
cultivation of the landscapist, and claims that since ‘limitless desire is a 
threat to life’, by virtue of ‘[enjoying] playing the [qin] lute, calligraphy, 
and painting, [wise people] replace worthless desires with [worthy play of 
art]’ (Bush and Shih, 2012: 141/146; Yu, 1986: 606).   
Before Jing Hao, the Tang art historian and critic Zhang Yanyuan 
(847) follows Xie He’s six laws in his Record of the Famous Painters of 
Successive Dynasties (Lidai Minghua Ji), although he does not apply the 
notion of qiyun to landscape painting.3 In his writing on the origin of 
Chinese painting, he cites the Han scholar Lu Ji’s claim that ‘the rise of 
paintings is like that of sacrificial hymns and songs, to celebrate great 
deeds’, since historical figures and events were popular subject-matters at 
the initial stage of painting (Lin, 1967: 45).4 Jing Hao locates the moral 
dimension of qiyun in the depicted natural object (the pine tree in his text) as 
seen above, while Zhang Yanyuan neither thinks landscape in paintings he 
has seen has qiyun nor directly links qiyun with a moral dimension in his 
                                                          
3 For an English translation of Lidai Minghua Ji, see Acker, 1954. 
4 For Zhang Yanyuan’ more discussion of painting’s moral relevance, see Lidai 
Minghua ji chapter 1 section 1; Acker, 1954: 61–80; Lin, 1967: 43–47. 
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text. 
Guo Ruoxu echoes Zhang Yanyuan in claiming that paintings 
depicting sages and worthies or recording moral figures’ historical stories 
directly show the moral function of ‘[appraising] critically their worth or 
folly or [shedding] light on their stability or disorder’ by reminding 
observers of the moral distinctiveness of the role models (Bush and Shih, 
2012: 93; Yu, 1986: 55). Zhang Yanyuan’s classification of two kinds of 
people capable of masterpieces (‘men robed and capped and of noble 
descent’, and ‘rare scholars and lofty-minded men’) appears to have inspired 
Guo Ruoxu’s view that paintings replete with qiyun were usually created by 
‘talented worthies of high position or superior gentlemen in retirement, who 
cleaved to loving-kindness and sought enjoyment in the arts or explored the 
abstruse and plumbed the depths’, and lodged lofty and refined emotions 
within their works (Acker, 1954: 153; Bush and Shih, 2012: 95‒96). For 
Guo Ruoxu, the last five laws by Xie He are ‘open to study’, while qiyun 
‘necessarily involves an innate knowledge; it assuredly cannot be secured 
through cleverness or close application, nor will time aid its attainment. It is 
an unspoken accord, a spiritual communion [shenhui]; “something that 
happens without one’s knowing how”’ (Bush and Shih, 2012: 95; Yu, 1986: 
59).5 Unlike Jing Hao who suggests that the moral dimension of qiyun is in 
                                                          
5 Soper (1951: 15) translates shenhui as ‘spiritual consonance’. For an English 
translation of Tuhua Jianwen Zhi with the translator’s notes, see Soper, 1951: 1–207. 
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the natural object such as the pine tree, Guo Ruoxu links the moral 
dimension of qiyun with the innate mental talent of the painter, which 
determines whether a painter can create a painting replete with qiyun. That 
is, for Guo Ruoxu, the moral dimension of qiyun directly relates to the 
artist’s character, rather than the object depicted.  
Three centuries later, Tang Hou does not stress the moral cultivation 
required by qiyun-focused artistic creation and appreciation as both Jing 
Hao and Guo Ruoxu suggest, although, from his Huajian (Criticism of 
Painting), one may see that these points are not excluded in his ideas of 
qiyun as the first criterion for painting connoisseurship.6 He writes that ‘The 
scions of good families must learn to look at calligraphy and painting’ (Bush 
and Shih, 2012: 260; Chou, 2001: 71; 2005: 97). In the light of Jing Hao’s 
view of the natural object’s qiyun’s moral dimension and Guo Ruoxu’s 
suggestion of the artist’s moral cultivation practised through spiritual 
communion with the object, one can understand more deeply why Tang Hou 
persuades people born in good families to learn to appreciate calligraphy 
and painting. In general, considering that Jing Hao, Guo Ruoxu, and Tang 
Hou are all familiar with the Confucian advocacy of the (moral) cultivation 
of mind as the basis of human social life, one may understand a rough 
                                                          
6 For an English translation of Huajian, see Chou, 2001: 64–175; 2005: 94–152. 
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continuity between them regarding the moral dimension of qiyun.7  
One may wonder how moral cultivation, as implied by Jing Hao, 
further suggested by Guo Ruoxu and echoed by Tang Hou, is involuntarily 
realised in, or at least accompanies, the practice of creating (and 
appreciating) a painting replete with qiyun. We have seen that Guo Ruoxu 
explicitly points out that creating a painting replete with qiyun requires 
spiritual communion between artist and object. That is, valuing qiyun above 
formal resemblance requires the artist to seek or experience the congeniality 
and resonance with the object at the congenial level of spirit-energy.8 For 
instance, for painting the bamboo, a spiritual accord and moral kinship 
needs to be cultivated between artist and object, so as to capture its internal 
feature of humility, rectitude, uprightness and chastity. Here, it should be 
stressed that, we cannot simply regard capturing the qiyun of the natural 
                                                          
7 The Great Learning (Legge, trans, 1914: 1‒23), one of the Confucian classics, tells 
of cultivating the self in eight steps. Among these eight, the first two are investigating 
things (gewu) and extending knowledge (zhizhi), and the next two are sincerity of thought 
(chengyi) and rectification of the mind (zhengxin). 
8 Guo Ruoxu’s idea of shenhui may be inspired by the South Dynasties artists and 
theorists Zong Bing (375–443) and Wang Wei (415–443), and the Tang art historians and 
critics Li Sizhen (d. 696) and Zhang Yanyuan, and this idea is found in his contemporary 
artists and critics Shen Kuo’s (1031–1095), Su Shi’s (1037–1101) and Huang Tingjian’s 
(1045–1105) writings, even though they do not apply the terminology of qiyun (see Bush 
and Shih, 2012: 37–39; Soper, 1951: 127; Peng, 1951: 139–140). Cahill (1959: 87) notes 
that Mencius regards reading literary works as a means of building the feelings of affinity 
with the scholars of antiquity, and this affinity is based on what later people call ‘shenhui’ 
(See Mencius, book V, part 2, chapter 8; see also Tu Wei-ming: 1983: 69–71).   
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object as the imposition or projection of human characteristics onto the 
external natural world, as this will distort our understanding of the equal and 
harmonious relationship between artist and natural object (in both 
Confucian thought and Daoist philosophy).9  
The spiritual communion may occur when the artist paints landscape 
in a spirit of reverence through an introvertive contemplation. As Guo 
Ruoxu’s contemporary landscapist and theorist Guo Xi (1000–1090) 
suggests, the appropriate way for either artist or audience to look at 
landscape is thus:  
 
Look with a heart in tune with forest and stream, then you will value them 
highly. Approach with the eyes of arrogance and extravagance, then you will 
value them but little. (Bush and Shih, 2012: 151; Yu, 1986: 632)  
 
The heart-mind in tune with forest and stream advocated by Guo Xi means a 
purification and emancipation of the mind demanded by aesthetic autonomy, 
but this mental purification appears to have moral significance. For Guo Xi, 
when looking at natural objects without an appropriate mental state or a 
                                                          
9 Tu Wei-ming (2004: 37) explains ganying as analogous to shenhui (spiritual 
communion): ‘the function of “affect and response” (ganying) characterizes nature as a 
great harmony and so informs the mind. The mind forms a union with nature by extending 
itself metonymically. Its aesthetic appreciation of nature is neither an appropriation of the 
object by the subject nor an imposition of the subject on the object, but the merging of the 
self into an expanded reality through transformation and participation’.  
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sincere attitude, the person will not discover the value of the landscape. He 
implies that moral self-cultivation is achieved through intuitive 
comprehension and absorbed contemplation in either artistic creation or 
appreciation, although he does not apply the terminology of qiyun in his 
writing. Ronald Egan (2016: 285–286) suggests that Guo Xi’s account in 
Linquan Gaozhi (Elevated Emotions in Forests and Streams) of how to 
capture the transformation of nature (zaohua) through painting echoes Jing 
Hao’s advocacy of conveying landscape’s zhen (embodied through qi and 
yun).10 Here, one may suggest that Guo Xi echoes Guo Ruoxu that the artist 
builds an effective sympathetic resonance with the object through intuitive 
engagement and aesthetic contemplation, and the moral cultivation of mind 
is conducted involuntarily in the process of creating a work replete with 
qiyun.  
The Qing critic Wang Yu (? –1748) echoes Guo Xi’s suggestion on 
the significance of contemplative engagement for a landscape painter,  
 
When the painter contemplates the true visage of the mountain and forests, 
showing it [by brushstrokes], how can he not be outstanding? … all the 
[shenyun] [spirit and consonance] of painting come from contemplation of 
dawn and dusk, the four seasons, the wind, fine, rain, and snow, and the 
                                                          
10 Guo Si (d. ca. 1130) compiled his father Guo Xi’s notes on landscape in 1117. 
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appearing and disappearing of the cloud and mist. (Gao, 1996: 138; with 
modifications)11  
 
By contemplating a painting, audiences also echo the mood of the painting 
initially created by the painter, as if they come to nature, locating 
themselves in mountains, and enjoying the pleasure of travelling forests and 
waters. As Guo Xi suggests, when the response to natural objects is one of a 
spiritual accord, the aesthetic pleasure of the heart-mind being in tune with 
forests and streams can be gained by sitting in a study and contemplating a 
landscape painting without leaving the room:  
 
To look at a particular (landscape) painting puts you in the corresponding 
mood. You seem in fact to be in those mountains. This is the mood of a 
painting beyond its mere scenery (Bush and Shih, 2012: 151/153–154, my 
emphasis; Yu, 1986: 632/635). 
 
No matter how long ago the work was created, through contemplative 
engagement, viewers with similar spiritual interests achieve a congenial 
spiritual accord with the object and feel a sense of affinity or communion 
with the artist of like mind. As Tu Wei-ming (1983: 70–71) says, ‘a smile 
between two resonating hearts or an encounter between two mutually 
responding spirits cannot be demonstrated to the insensitive eye or the 
                                                          
11 Shenyun and qiyun are often used interchangeably in classical texts on painting. 
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unattuned ear.’ 
What philosophical ideas underpin the moral relevance of spiritual 
kinship and resonance between artist, object, audience, and work? Peng Lai 
(2016: 138–139) suggests that Guo Ruoxu’s stress on the artist’s mental 
disposition may be inspired by his contemporary Neo-Confucianists Zhang 
Zai’s (1020–1077) and Cheng Hao’s (1032–1085) views on the mind and 
human nature. Inspired by James Cahill’s discussion of painting as a 
reflection of Neo-Confucian cheng in Song scholar-artists’ aesthetics, I 
suggest that the sincerity (cheng) valued as a basic requirement for scholars 
cultivating the mind in accord with the Dao may help us to understand the 
moral significance in the spiritual affinity between artist, object, audience 
and work under the notion of spiritual communion.12   
As Guo Ruoxu’s contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar Zhou Dunyi 
(1017–1073) claims, ‘sagehood is simply a matter of sincerity, […] sincerity 
is the foundation of the five virtues, and the source of all virtuous conduct’ 
(Cahill, 1959: 96). In the light of the Confucian philosophy of sincerity, a 
painting by a pure and lofty mind, is ‘a reflection of his sincerity’ (Cahill, 
1959: 96). When the artist has Confucian sincerity in animating the mental 
image of the object depicted in his untrammelled imaginative evocation, and 
releasing pictorial yi (idea) or yixiang (idea-image) into the final images 
                                                          
12 The Northern Song scholar Wang Qinchen echoes his contemporary Guo Ruoxu’s 
suggestion of painting as mind-print and further suggests that the ideal mental state for art, 
is letting the mind be ‘in accord with the Dao’ (Bush and Shih, 2012: 209). 
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replete with qiyun, he is achieving mental catharsis and cultivating his moral 
sentiments along with forgetting the hindrances of all sensuous desires in 
the secular world. As Zhou Dunyi asserts,  
 
Wuyu (no desire) results in vacuity when in quiescence, and 
straightforwardness when in movement. Vacuity in quiescence leads to 
enlightenment, and enlightenment leads to comprehension. Likewise 
straightforwardness in movement leads to impartiality, and impartiality leads 
to universality. One is almost a sage when one has such enlightenment, 
comprehension, impartiality, and universality. (Fung, 1948: 271)13 
 
The Ming Neo-Confucian scholar Wang Shouren (1472–1528) further 
emphasizes the significance of sincerity for the Doctrine of the Mean: 
‘“Only those of the utmost Sincerity in the world are able to fathom their 
natures”, and thereby understand the transformations of Heaven and Earth’ 
(Tiwald and Norden, 2014: 270; the Doctrine of the Mean, chapter 22). For 
him, sincerity of thought is necessarily involved in the process of 
investigating things and extending knowledge; when thought is of the 
utmost sincerity, the mind is also rectified (Fung, 1948: 314). 
Some might find it hard to understand that sincerity is cherished as a 
basis of virtue in East Asia where Confucian moral principles have 
                                                          
13 Here, we can see that the emphasis on impartiality and universality resonates with 
Kant’s ethics, although for Zhou Dunyi such adjectives as impartiality and universality 
refer to qualities of moral sentiment or character.  
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influenced people’s moral judgment and conduct for more than two 
thousand years. A. T. Nuyen’s (2011: 526–537) comparison between the 
Kantian good will and Confucian sincerity (sincere will) may help Western 
readers understand the meaning, centrality, and significance of sincerity for 
the Chinese (and other nationalities practising Confucian ethics). As Nuyen 
(2011: 526–537) argues, Confucian sincerity or sincere will ‘conditions 
other virtues through will’, and is ‘equivalent to’ Kant’s good will, in terms 
of acting as an essential condition of other virtues.14 I agree with Nuyen 
(2011: 532) that conduct conforming to the Confucian virtues such as ren 
(benevolence or humaneness), yi (rightfulness), li (propriety), zhi (wisdom), 
xin (trustworthiness or integrity), zhong (loyalty or faithfulness), jing 
(respect), and yong (courage), ‘are good only if they are exercised by a 
person with sincere will’. For instance, if a person does not sincerely will to 
                                                          
14 For Kant, the person of ‘good will’ is the person who acts for the sake of duty – 
such a person’s motive for action is determined by reason according to the moral law that 
binds all rational agents universally rather than by desire for expected consequences or by 
emotion, feeling, sentiment or inclination. Kant (6: 394/405) makes duty instead of virtue 
the fundamental notion: the good will defined in terms of duty is completely good in itself 
without qualification or limitation, and virtue is ‘the moral strength of a human being’s will 
in fulfilling his duty’. One may think that, contrary to Kant’s duty-based ethics, Confucian 
ethics is a virtue-based ethics, and ‘sincerity’ signifies the virtue of such dispositions as 
telling the truth, although, as mentioned above, Nuyen convincingly argues that there are 
parallels between Confucian sincerity (sincere will) and Kant’s good will. Chung-ying 
Cheng (2010: 98) argues that the Confucian ultimate principle of ren is ‘the perfect virtue 
for all virtues and also the duty of virtue for all duties of virtues’. Following Chung-ying 
Cheng’s suggestion of ren as the duty of virtue, the sincere will conditioning ren appears 
equivalent to Kant’s good will.  
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be benevolent but shows benevolent conduct just for the sake of gaining a 
good reputation, other’s trust or any other purposes, he is not regarded as 
genuinely benevolent.   
The spiritual kinship guaranteed by sincere will in engaging in the 
imaginative evocation of idea-images (yixiang) of the object and spiritual 
communion with the object and the artist is what the Southern Song Neo-
Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (1130–1200) means by his comment on Su Shi’s 
painting:  
 
As for [Su Shi], he possessed lofty and enduring qualities and a firm and 
immovable appearance. One might say that he resembled these “bamboo 
gentlemen” and “rock friends” [which he painted]. After a hundred 
generation, when men look at this painting, they will still be able to see him 
in their mind. (Bush and Shih, 2012: 202) 
 
Penetrating the strength and momentum of the brushstrokes, the yixiang of 
the object initially animated in the painter’s mind is evoked in the 
imagination of the congenial and ‘sincere’ viewer. The congenial and 
‘sincere’ viewer appreciates the sincerity of the artist conveying qiyun and 
his emotions crystalized in every stroke, through contemplating the qiyun of 
the object or work and having a sympathetic resonance with it. His poetic 
reflection evoked by the qiyun of the work enables him to feel the sense of 
affinity with the kindred spirit (of the object and of the artist) conveyed 
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through the painting. 
In sum, qiyun-focused landscape art requires the artist to have spiritual 
resonance with the object, and also enables congenial communion between 
the artist and spectator. Moral cultivation through qiyun-focused landscape 
art is endorsed by the sincerity (conditioning virtues as explained in 
Confucian ethics) involved in imaginative evocation of idea-images of the 
natural object when the congenial artist is engaging in spiritual communion 
with the object, or the congenial audience is sharing the sense of affinity 
with the artist and the subject-matter of the work in artistic contemplation. 
 
3. The Reconciliation of Aesthetic Autonomy and Moral 
Relevance  
 
As seen above, the Confucian sincerity involved in bringing the scholar-
artist’s or audience’s mind in accord with the Dao and engaging in spiritual 
communion with the object or work guarantees the spiritual affinity between 
artist, object, audience and work has a moral dimension. In this section, I 
suggest that although classical texts about qiyun aesthetics written on a more 
pragmatic basis suggest that the Chinese approach remains focused on the 
lived experience and practice of artists and appreciators and do not supply a 
systematic analysis of these issues, the parallels and differences between the 
Chinese aesthetic tradition and Kantian ideas regarding the moral relevance 
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of art may help us better understand the moral dimension of qiyun. 
Although by positing different grounds for beauty and morality Kant’s 
aesthetics suggests that beauty is independent from morality, his accounts of 
aesthetic autonomy and the relationship between beauty and morality do not 
rule out the possibility of moral cultivation through art. He suggests that an 
intellectual interest in the beautiful does not contradict his insistence on the 
disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment. Jane Kneller (2007: 60‒71) agrees 
with Karl Ameriks (1995: 361‒367) that the intellectual interest in the 
beautiful that Kant also calls love is ‘at least an attunement favorable to 
moral feeling’ and suggests that for Kant, our intellectual interest in the 
beautiful (nature and art) is akin to our moral interest in the good, even 
though the former is free, analogous to an intellectual love (which is neither 
pathological, nor practical) and the latter is based on the rational law or 
categorical imperative. Paul Guyer (1993: 34/36) argues that for Kant 
aesthetic experience may contribute to moral psychology and moral 
epistemology, since aesthetic experience ‘serves the purpose of morality 
most directly by improving our propensity for moral feeling’, and ‘aesthetic 
phenomena can offer sensible representation of practical reason, of specific 
moral conceptions, and finally, of the general relation between moral reason 
and moral feelings’. I agree with Guyer and Kneller that Kant implies the 
possibility of moral cultivation through art. Since Kant defines the aesthetic 
idea as the representation of imagination, his notion of beauty as expression 
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of the aesthetic idea may leave space for moral relevance, although the 
aesthetic idea is not necessarily a signifier of morality. Similarly, it is worth 
stressing that in Chinese landscape art, although landscape or some natural 
plants are read as having virtues, the natural object itself cannot be simply 
understood as the symbolic signifier of human moral attributes as mentioned 
above. In addition, the pictorial yi (idea) as analogous to Kant’s aesthetic 
idea is not necessarily required to reflect the moral content.15  
Even though the aesthetic idea in an artwork does not necessarily 
involve a sensible representation of practical reason and moral conviction, 
Weijia Wang (2018: 853–875) argues that both the artist and the audience 
may cultivate their moral sense through reflecting on aesthetic freedom 
which is analogous to reflection on moral freedom, and thus moral 
cultivation is a kind of indirect duty for anyone encountering or creating 
beauty (of nature and art). We now need to see whether further aspects of 
Kant’s account of the analogy between our reflection on beauty and that on 
morality may be projected into the qiyun-focused artistic context.  
Kant (KU 5: 353) claims that ‘beauty is the symbol of the morally 
good’. For Kant (KU 5: 354), beauty (i) pleases immediately (‘but only in 
reflecting intuition’ rather than in concept), (ii) without the involvement of 
any interest (sensuous, or intellectual or moral satisfaction which depends 
on concern for the existence of the object, concept, or action), (iii) as the 
                                                          
15 Regarding the parallels and differences between pictorial yi and Kant’s aesthetic 
idea, see Hu, 2019b. 
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reflection or result of the freedom of the imagination ‘in accord with the 
lawfulness of the understanding’ in aesthetic judgment, and (iv) such 
(subjective) aesthetic pleasure is universally valid for everyone (but not by 
means of any universal concept). According to Kant, morality acts for the 
sake of duty, in categorical imperatives willed through practical reason 
according to rational law, and as universalizable maxims or principles treats 
humanity as an end in itself rather than a mere means. The moral good (i) 
pleases immediately in reflecting on concepts rather than intuition, (ii) being 
independent of any antecedent interest (but ‘necessarily connected with an 
interest […] that is thereby first produced’), (iii) as the reflection or result of 
the freedom of the will (instead of the imagination) ‘in accordance with 
universal laws of reason’, and (iv) with universal validity for everyone ‘by 
means of universal concept’ (KU 5: 354). Thus, the symbolic relationship 
between beauty and morality does not consist in or relate to the content of 
each. Nevertheless, the form of our reflection on beauty as analogous to that 
on morality lies in the analogy between the four aspects of immediacy, 
disinterestedness, freedom, and universal validity in both aesthetic judgment 
and moral judgement just mentioned. 
Firstly, regarding the immediacy and disinterestedness of aesthetic 
freedom and moral freedom, it seems that in the qiyun-focused context 
aesthetic freedom and moral freedom converge in the mind’s pursuit of 
accordance with the Dao. For a Chinese landscapist or a spectator of 
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landscape painting, the moment of enjoying aesthetic freedom in an 
aesthetic experience seems to be that of simultaneously cultivating moral 
freedom.  
The detached mental freedom experienced by qiyun-focused artists in 
artistic practice appears consistent with Kant’s aesthetic freedom on the one 
hand (Hu, 2019a: 129–131). However, regarding the free and harmonious 
play of the faculties of the mind, Chinese texts on painting do not have as 
sophisticated and systematic an analysis as Kant, and there are essential 
differences between their philosophical occupations. Although the carefree 
shen (spirit) of the qiyun-focused artist parallels Kant’s notion of spirit as 
the animating principle of genius (the union of the imagination and 
understanding), the first criterion of qiyun requires the spirit (shen) of the 
artist to respond to the spirit (shen) of the object depicted (Hu: 2019b). 
Harmony (of the imagination and the understanding) in Kant is intra-
subjective, since it is inside the mind of an individual, although it is 
universally shared by all individuals involved. Christian Helmut Wenzel 
(2006: 100; 2010: 329) suggests that the harmony in Confucian li (ritual or 
propriety) seen from the outside might correspond to a harmony inside (that 
is, internal to the mind of the agent who practicing the ritual), and thus may 
be ‘the mirror image of the harmony in the free play of our cognitive 
faculties, imagination and understanding’ defined by Kant as the mental 
status of the agent engaging in aesthetic judgment, although this harmony is 
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inter-subjective and also includes the harmony of human beings with 
nature.16 Similarly to li (ritual or ceremony), the notion of yun (consonance 
or harmony of qi) is more inter-subjective, and involves the harmonious 
sympathetic resonance between subject and object, which is absent in 
Kant’s philosophy.  
On the other hand, this aesthetic freedom can reach a harmonious 
consensus with the Confucian sincere will which conditions virtues, 
endorses moral freedom and is analogous to the Kantian good will as 
mentioned in the last section. However, as mentioned above, in his 
philosophical system, Kant distinguishes aesthetic freedom and moral 
freedom, claiming that the former is the freedom of the imagination in 
accord with the understanding, while the latter is the freedom of the will in 
accordance with the categorical imperative of reason (KU 5: 354). This 
Kantian dualism cannot be found in the Chinese context where artists and 
audiences engage in a detached mental state in accord with the Dao which 
penetrates everything.  
Although Schiller defends the Kantian view of aesthetic autonomy, he 
has more confidence in the moral significance of art, so one might ask 
whether his modified Kantian ideas regarding the reconciliation of aesthetic 
                                                          
16  Li (ritual or propriety) along with music have an aesthetic, ethical and political 
significance in Confucian philosophy. For a discussion of the aesthetic dimension and 
moral relevance of Confucian li and how calligraphy embodies aesthetic and ethical 
appropriateness of Confucian li, see Mullis, 2007: 99–107.  
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autonomy and moral relevance has greater similarity to this reconciliation in 
the qiyun-focused context.17 Guyer (1993: 116) notes that ‘Schiller 
understood Kant’s idea that the aesthetic can serve the purposes of morality 
only by remaining free of constraint, including constraint by morality itself’. 
For Schiller (2003: 156), when artists pursue morality, the moral purpose 
will destroy the autonomy or heautonomy of appearance of the object 
depicted, and thus interfere and even inhibit the beauty of the work, since 
‘the form of this object will be determined by the idea of practical reason, 
not through itself, and thus will become heteronomous’. Therefore, he 
advises artists that a moral end or content is ‘best hidden’ in the form of art, 
and beauty should ‘appear to come from the nature of the thing completely 
freely and without force’ (Schiller, 2003: 156). In addition, Schiller (1982: 
100–109/122–127; 2003: 152/162) suggests that beauty (as living form or 
                                                          
17 For Schiller (2003: 152‒153/156), morality as self-determination through practical 
reason according to the moral law, is ‘the agreement of an action with the form of pure 
will’, while beauty as appearance in self-determination through its own nature, is ‘the 
analogy of an appearance with the form of pure will or freedom’. In aesthetic 
contemplation, even though aesthetic freedom in sensuous appearance (read by reason 
cooperating with sensibility) appears analogous to the moral autonomy possessed by 
rational beings, Schiller clearly distinguishes the autonomy/heautonomy of beauty and 
moral autonomy (See Schiller, 2003: 148‒174/177–183; Beiser, 2005: 219–223; Houlgate, 
2008: 42–45). ‘What Schiller means by autonomy is that the self-determining object 
follows the law of its own nature (that is nature in artfulness/lawfulness), while 
heautonomy means the law of the nature of the object is created by the object itself and the 
law of self-determination derives from its own inner nature, referring to 
artfulness/technique in freedom, as “an intensification of autonomy”’ (Hu, 2019a: 137). 
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appearance of freedom) stimulates the play drive to exclude any sensuous 
constraints or rational bounds and the play drive exerts the most vibrant 
physical power of sensibility (which supplies content) and the mightiest 
intellectual powers of reason (which offers form). Frederick Beiser (2005: 
223) points out that in his letters to Körner Schiller initially uses the idea of 
heautonomy to define the beauty of the object, but applies it to human 
nature in his letters on the aesthetic education of man. For Schiller (1982: 
144‒153), aesthetic freedom, which furnishes aesthetic determinability in 
aesthetic judgment refers to the freedom of free choice exercised in aesthetic 
play when sensibility and reason are in harmonious cooperation and 
reciprocity, not one overcoming another (see also Beiser, 2005: 
154‒156/232‒234).18 Thus, aesthetic freedom is significant in guiding 
human beings to enter the rational realm where they perform duties from 
(cultivated and internalised) joyful inclination (in most untragic situations, 
against inclination merely in rare tragic situations) (see Schiller, 2005: 
145/154/158; Beiser, 2005: 144‒145/211‒212).19 The exercise of aesthetic 
                                                          
18 I (2019a: 134–141) have argued that balanced human nature nourished through art 
can also be found in the qiyun-focused landscape painting context, and also pointed out the 
issues of projecting Schiller’s account regarding the restoration of complete human nature 
through art into the qiyun-focused context. 
19 For Schiller, severe rationalism has as destructive an effect on human beings as 
hedonism does, so his aesthetic freedom in balancing sensibility and reason is supposed to 
lead human beings to an idealistic and healthy middle path between stoicism and 
Epicureanism, and the significance of art lies in its function of enabling human beings to be 
self-conscious in their willing of free choice (Beiser, 2005: 144‒145/211‒212).   
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autonomy can promote the restoration of a whole human nature, and this 
whole nature is also demanded in moral judgment:  
 
when a person does his duty from inclination he will be heautonomous, 
acting from the necessity of his own nature, though here his nature is not 
equivalent to only his natural or phenomenal being but also comprises his 
rational or noumenal being (Beiser, 2005: 223‒224).20  
 
Although as mentioned above Guyer and Kneller have argued that Kant’s 
aesthetics implies the possibility of cultivating moral sentiments through 
aesthetic experience, Schiller’s somewhat modified Kantian account appears 
more explicitly to stress that morally significant inclination can be exercised 
through aesthetic experience.21 Schiller’s view of internalised inclination as 
conforming to moral duty and cultivated and habitualised through art 
appears to parallel the Chinese view of moral sentiments or virtues 
conditioned by the sincere will that may be fulfilled involuntarily but also 
actually willed voluntarily through art. Schillerian unity within dualism 
cannot be found in the qiyun-focused aesthetic context where moral 
sentiments are exercised in aesthetic contemplation through sympathetic 
                                                          
20 Beiser (2005: 176‒179) also stresses that what Schiller means by inclination in his 
discussion of performing duty from inclination is not natural inclination, but the cultivated, 
habitualised, internalised inclination gained through aesthetic education.  
21 Kantian scholars have argued that Kant’s ethics does not rule out the role of moral 
sentiments in moral perfection (see Denis, 2006: 519; Sherman, 1977: 121‒186). 
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resonance and spiritual communion between the artist, object, audience and 
work, and endorsed by the sincere will. Even so, the similar stress on the 
cultivation or habituation of moral sentiments or inclination through 
aesthetic experience also signifies the moral significance of art.  
Secondly, behind the parallels between qiyun aesthetics and Kant’s 
philosophy, there are differences concerning the promotion of moral 
community through aesthetic community. For Kant, that aesthetic pleasure 
and aesthetic freedom originally aroused in artists could apply to spectators 
is based on the universality of the free play of imagination and 
understanding in aesthetic judgment (KU 5: 217‒219). In order to arouse a 
corresponding response in spectators, the artist starts from the universal 
standpoint, since he not only ‘wants to submit the object to his own eyes’, 
but also speaks with ‘a universal voice and lays claim to the consent of 
everyone’ (KU 5: 216). The universal validity and communicability of 
aesthetic judgment shared by the artist and spectators is based on a sensus 
communis (common sense) shared by human beings, which is ‘essentially 
different from the common understanding that is sometimes also called 
common sense’, since the free play of imagination and understanding as the 
faculties of mind along with the a priori principle of purposiveness are the 
grounds for justifying this universal agreement of aesthetic taste (see 
Wenzel, 2005: 81‒85; KU 5: 238‒240/293‒296). Thus, it may be concluded 
that Kant’s transcendental idea of the universal validity and 
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communicability of aesthetic judgment explains the sense of aesthetic 
affinity felt by the artist and audiences. This universal validity and 
communicability of aesthetic taste works (a priori) to establish an aesthetic 
community (see Vandenabeele, 2010: 308‒320). On the other hand, Kant 
stresses the universal validity of moral autonomy. As mentioned above, 
Kant’s view of beauty as the symbol of morality suggests the form of 
reflection on beauty is analogous to that on morality. Everyone in an 
aesthetic community may have the same potential to achieve moral 
cultivation through his/her reflection on aesthetic freedom which is 
analogous to that on moral freedom. That is, the aesthetic community may 
indirectly trigger a moral community. However, Zvi Tauber (2006: 36‒39) 
doubts the feasibility of the Kantian idealistic transition (or leap) from 
beauty to morality, claiming that since beauty (as the presentation of 
appearance, above reality) and morality (practiced in actual reality), as Kant 
understands them, are ontologically different, aesthetic experience which is 
indifferent to real existence cannot have a moral effect unless accompanied 
by moral education.  
In the qiyun-focused context, we have seen that an aesthetic 
community contributes to the establishment of a moral community in a 
practical sense, since in the process of appreciating the work, viewers of 
kindred minds are stimulated to echo the painter’s mind, and this may 
simultaneously enable or encourage their moral elevation. In addition, 
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natural objects are part of the aesthetic and moral community of beings. 
Unlike with Kant’s account of the free play of imagination and 
understanding and the sensus communis, the morally relevant aesthetic 
communicability is based on the spiritual kinship between artist, object, 
audience and work, which are united under the notion of qiyun. This is 
absent in Kant’s aesthetics which, consistently with his overall 
transcendental philosophical system, focuses on the subject, although of 
course Kant does not deny that aesthetic judgments involve objects (Hu, 
2019b). 
Regarding the promotion of moral community through aesthetic 
community, again one may find more plausible parallels between qiyun 
aesthetics and Schiller’s ideas, since he advocates aesthetic education as a 
bottom-up approach to realising the aesthetic state as his republican ideal, 
which has the advantage of avoiding government interference and bypassing 
ethical religion. In Schiller’s (1982: 160‒219) aesthetic state, human beings 
transcend natural desires by taking pleasure in creating or appreciating form, 
and ‘the love of form’ enables them to value things beyond the satisfaction 
of physical needs; through aesthetic practice they exercises their rationality 
and sensibilities together and this helps them achieve a harmony of spirit 
and nature (see also Beiser, 2005: 159–160). In his view, the aesthetic state 
is much better than either the dynamic state or the ethical state, since only in 
the aesthetic state can human beings avoid the compulsion of sensuous 
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nature and the rational law and their freedom of will in accordance with 
complete humanity is respected and realised (Schiller, 1982: 204‒219; 
Beiser, 2005: 162‒163).22 However, some critics such as Beiser (2005: 
128‒129/164), Georg Lukács (1971: 139) and Kai Hammermeister (2002: 
59–60) think that the moral cultivation through art Schiller envisages is 
narrowly confined to an elite class, and his aesthetic state appears to be 
politically utopian. For instance, Beiser (2005: 128‒129/164) claims that 
Schiller’s aesthetic approach to realising his ideal republic falls into 
‘resignation to a grim political reality’ and ‘recognition of the ideal’s purely 
regulative status’, since it appears unrealistic when the government is 
repressive, or most people in society are corrupted and unwilling to accept 
aesthetic education, or there is no influential artist able to create the 
powerful artwork to inspire people to engage in artistic contemplation. 
The issue of elitism often worsened by problematic political situations 
is also found in the qiyun-focused context where the practice of scholar-
artists building an aesthetic community to avoid political corruption 
sometimes fell into retreat from worldly reality. This was, especially the 
                                                          
22 For Schiller, the dynamic state enforces laws to protect individuals’ private 
interests and legal rights from being infringed by punishing illegal actions which violate 
other’s interests and rights, so it satisfies citizens’ demands of as sensuous animals, and 
limits their actions within a legitimate scope, rather than caring about their internal motives 
and moral characters. The ethical state cares about individuals’ internal motives and 
characters instead of actions and private rights, where citizens as rational beings and co-
legislators are treated as ends rather than means, but encounters compulsion from the 
rational law especially when the rational law is against individual inclination.  
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case in periods when the political situation appeared dangerous for scholars 
serving the government, and the elite adopted art as a way of escaping 
political corruption and maintaining individual inner-peace. For instance, in 
the Yuan Dynasty when China was ruled by the Mongolians, many Yuan 
scholar-artists chose to withdraw from the world and live the life of a 
recluse or semi-recluse, far away from political affairs. Even though the 
individual moral self is purified by lodging lofty emotions and thought 
within art, and later artists and connoisseurs with congenial spirits may have 
spirit resonance with those earlier artists when contemplating their works, 
the aesthetic community did not involuntarily promote the establishment of 
a politically effective moral community.  
Despite this charge of elitism, however, whether in Chinese texts in 
relation to qiyun aesthetics or in Schiller’s letters, the moral and even 
political significance of art is affirmatively and optimistically valued. As 
Schiller (1982: 219) enthusiastically states,  
 
where is [the aesthetic state] to be found? As a need, it exists in every finely 
attuned soul, as a realised fact, we are likely to find it, like the pure Church 
and the pure Republic, only in some few chosen circles. 
 
As mentioned above, Zhu Xi praises the spirit Su Shi expressed in his 
painting and suggests that even though a hundred generations have passed 
later audiences will be able to see his mind in the painting and feel the sense 
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of spiritual kinship and community. Although this aesthetic, moral and even 
political community stimulated by art may be criticized for being confined 
to the life of intellectual elites, it is endorsed by numerous artists and critics 
and is able to transcend the boundary of time and space and illuminate and 
unite every ‘finely attuned soul’ throughout the long history of Chinese art.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the qiyun-focused aesthetic context, the sense of affinity or community 
aroused between the artist, object, work and audience is the result of the 
spiritual communion and resonance of kindred spirits during aesthetic 
contemplation. Confucian idea of sincerity underpins the moral dimension 
of spiritual communion between the artist, the natural object depicted, and 
the congenial audience stimulated by artworks. The moral significance of 
qiyun-focused art is not merely for individuals but works for an aesthetic 
and ethical community, since a congenial spectator with sincere will may 
experience an intimate spiritual kinship with the artist when contemplating 
the qiyun of the work, and his moral self will also be nourished during the 
process of viewing the painting and feeling the sense of affinity with like 
minds. In the process of projecting Kantian views of art and morality into 
the qiyun-focused context, we have seen these differences behind the 
parallels: Firstly, Kant distinguishes aesthetic freedom and moral freedom, 
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while in the qiyun-focused context the convergence of aesthetic freedom and 
moral freedom is predicated on the mind’s pursuit of accord with the Dao. 
Regarding the free and harmonious play of the faculties of the mind, 
harmony in Kant’s philosophy is intra-subjective, while the notion of yun is 
more inter-subjective and involves a harmonious sympathetic resonance 
between subject and object, which is absent in Kant’s philosophy. Although 
according to Confucian ethics moral sentiments and characters potentially 
fulfilled through art are conditioned by the sincere will as analogous to 
Kant’s good will, Schiller’s view of internalised inclination as conforming 
to moral duty and cultivated through art appears to better resonate with the 
valuing of moral sentiments cultivated and habitualised through spiritual 
communion between artist, object, work and audience in the qiyun-focused 
context. This parallel still looks superficial, since the latter does not approve 
Kantian dualism, let alone unity within dualism. Secondly, similarly to 
Kantian philosophy, qiyun aesthetics suggest that the aesthetic community 
contributes to the establishment of the moral community, although morally 
relevant aesthetic communicability is based on the spiritual kinship between 
artist, object, audience and work, and natural objects are part of this 
aesthetic and moral community of beings. We have seen that Schiller’s 
account of aesthetic education appears to offer closer parallels with the 
Chinese ideas regarding the moral and even political significance of 
aesthetic community, although in the latter context the attuned or kindred 
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minds are united under the criterion of qiyun and the sincere will engages in 
aesthetic contemplation and congenial spiritual communion. Even though 
this aesthetic and moral community may be charged as confined to the class 
of intellectual elites, qiyun aesthetics transcends the boundary of time and 
space in terms of uniting congenial minds in the past, present and future. 
 
References 
 
Acker, William (1954), Some T'ang and Pre-T'ang Texts on Chinese 
Painting, Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
Ameriks, Karl (1995), ‘On Paul Guyer’s Kant and the Experience of 
Freedom’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60 (2): 
361‒367. 
Beiser, Frederick (2005), Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-examination, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bush, Susan and Hsio-yen Shih (eds) (2012), Early Chinese Texts on 
Painting, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Cahill, James (1959), ‘Confucian Elements in the Theory of Painting’, in A. 
Wright (ed.) Confucianism and Chinese Civilization, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.  
Cheng, Chung-ying (2010), ‘Incorporating Kantian Good Will: On 
Confucian Ren as Perfect Duty’, in: S. R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Xiaoyan Hu                         The Moral Dimension of Qiyun Aesthetics and Some Kantian Resonances 
 
 
 
370 
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 11, 2019 
 
Personhood: Kant and Asian philosophy, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
GmbH & Co. 
Chou, Diana Yeongchau (2001), Reexamination of Tang Hou and his 
‘Huajian’, Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas. 
— (2005), A Study and Translation from the Chinese of Tang Hou's Huajian 
(Examination of painting): Cultivating Taste in Yuan China, 1279-
1368, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press. 
Denis, Lara (2006), ‘Kant’s Conception of Virtue’, in: P. Guyer (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Egan, Ronald C. (2016), ‘Conceptual and Qualitative Terms in Historical 
Perspective’, in: M. J. Powers and K. R. Tsiang (eds.), A Companion 
to Chinese Art, Malden: Willey Blackwell. 
Fung, Yu-lan (1948), A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, edited by Derk 
Bodde, New York: The Free Press. 
Gao, Jianping (1996), The Expressive Act in Chinese Art. From Calligraphy 
to Painting, Aesthetica Upsaliensia 7, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International. 
Guyer, Paul (1993), Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on 
Aesthetics and Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hammermeister, Kai (2002), The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Xiaoyan Hu                         The Moral Dimension of Qiyun Aesthetics and Some Kantian Resonances 
 
 
 
371 
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 11, 2019 
 
Houlgate, Stephen (2008), ‘Schiller and the Dance of Beauty’, Inquiry, vol. 
51 (1) pp. 37–49. 
Hu, Xiaoyan (2016), ‘The Notion of “Qi Yun” (Spirit Consonance) in 
Chinese Painting’, Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics. 
vol. 8, pp. 247–268. 
— (2019a), ‘A Kantian Reading of Aesthetic Freedom and Complete 
Human Nature Nourished through Art in a Classical Chinese Artistic 
Context’, Asian Philosophy, vol. 29 (2), pp.128–143.  
— (2019b), ‘Genius as an Innate Mental Talent of Idea-giving in Chinese 
Painting and Kant’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 70, no. 3 (2020). 
Doi: 10.1353/pew.0.0175 
Kant, Immanuel (1999), Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by 
Mary J. Gregor, General Introduction by Allen Wood, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
— (2001), Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited by Paul Guyer, 
translated by Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kneller, Jane (2007), Kant and the Power of Imagination, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Legge, James (trans) (1914), The Four Books or The Chinese Classics, 
Shanghai: The China Book Company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Xiaoyan Hu                         The Moral Dimension of Qiyun Aesthetics and Some Kantian Resonances 
 
 
 
372 
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 11, 2019 
 
Lin, Yutang (1967), The Chinese Theory of Art: Translations from the 
Masters of Chinese Art, London: Heinemann. 
Lukács, Georg (1971), History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist 
Dialectics, translated by Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge: The MIT 
Press. 
Mullis, Eric C. (2007), ‘The Ethics of Confucian Artistry’, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 65 (1), pp. 99–107.   
Munakata, Kiyohiko (1974), Ching Hao’s Pi-fa-chi: A Note on the Art of 
Brush, Ascona: Artibus Asiae. 
Nuyen, A. T. (2011), ‘The Kantian Good Will and the Confucian Sincere 
Will’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 38 (4), pp. 526–537. 
Peng, Lai (2016), ‘Guo Ruoxu Qiyun Feishi Shuo Yu Beisong Wenrenhua 
Sichao’ (Guo Ruoxu’s Claim of the Impossibility of Teaching Qiyun 
and Northern Song Literati Painting Ideas), Wenyi Yanjiu (The Study of 
Literature and Art), (3), pp. 133–144.  
Schiller, Friedrich (1982), On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of 
Letters, translated by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2003), ‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Körner’, 
translated by Stefan Bird-Pollan, in J. M. Bernstein (ed.), Classic and 
Romantic German Aesthetics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Xiaoyan Hu                         The Moral Dimension of Qiyun Aesthetics and Some Kantian Resonances 
 
 
 
373 
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 11, 2019 
 
— (2005), ‘On Grace and Dignity’, translated by Jane V. Curran, in Jane V. 
Curran and Christophe Fricker (eds.), Schiller’s ‘On Grace and 
Dignity’ in Its Cultural Context Essays and a New Translation, New 
York: Camden House. 
Sherman, Nancy (1997), Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant 
on Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Slingerland, Edward (trans) (2005), Confucius The Essential Analects: 
Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary, Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 
Soper, Alexander (trans & annot) 1951, Kuo Jo-hxü’s Experiences in 
Painting (T’u-Hua Chien-wen Chih): An Eleventh Century History of 
Chinese Painting Together with the Chinese Text in Facsimile, 
Washington: American Council of Learned Societies. 
Tauber, Zvi (2006), ‘Aesthetic Education for Morality: Schiller and Kant’, 
Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 40 (3), pp. 22–47. 
Tiwald, Justin and Bryan W. Van. Norden (eds) (2014), Readings in Later 
Chinese Philosophy: Han Dynasty to the 20th Century, Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 
Tu, Wei-ming (1983), ‘The Idea of the Human in Mencian Thought: An 
Approach to Chinese Aesthetics’, in: S. Bush and C. Murck (eds.), 
Theories of the Arts in China, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Xiaoyan Hu                         The Moral Dimension of Qiyun Aesthetics and Some Kantian Resonances 
 
 
 
374 
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 11, 2019 
 
— (2004) ‘The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature’, in: C. H. 
Dale (ed.), Chinese Aesthetics and Literature: A Reader, Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Vandenabeele, Bart (2010), ‘Common Sense and Community in Kant’s 
Theory of Taste’, in: S. R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: 
Kant and Asian Philosophy, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.  
Wang, Weijia (2018), ‘Beauty as the Symbol of Morality: A Twofold Duty 
in Kant’s Theory of Taste’, Dialogue 57 (2018): 853–875. 
Wenzel, Christian Helmut (2005), An Introduction to Kant’s Aesthetics: 
Core Concepts and Problems, Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
— (2006), ‘Beauty in Kant and Confucius. A First Step’, Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 33 (2006): 95–107. 
— (2010) ‘Aesthetics and Morality in Kant and Confucius: A Second Step’, 
in: S.R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian 
Philosophy, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. 
Yu, Jianhua, (ed) (1986), Zhongguo Hualun Leibian (2nd ed) (Chinese 
Painting Theory by Categories), Beijing: Renmin Meishu Chubanshe. 
